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There are two main types of jihadi terrorism that have plagued the Western world in the 
post 9/11 era: Organized attacks planned by an established terrorist groups and homegrown 
attacks carried out by unaffiliated individuals. A fundamentalist interpretation of Islam known as 
Salafism is used as a starting point and inspiration for such organizations and individuals to 
commit jihadist violence against the West. Terrorist organizations that use a Salafist 
interpretation of Islam have had the largest presence in the post-9/11 world such as Al-Qaeda 
and their affiliates and the Islamic State and their affiliates. This project aims to find out the 
overall threat Salafist terrorism poses to the United States and Western Europe as well as the 
threat of each type of terrorism in these regions. Secondary sources ranging from subjects on 
Muslim immigration to Europe to common trends in attacks that have occurred on Western soil 
since 9/11 will be used extensively to accurately calculate the threat of each type of attack. The 
Global Terrorism Database will also be used to extract valuable data over target locations, types 
of weapons used, and casualties per attacks. In addition, primary sourced documents, such as Al-
Qaeda’s Inspire, and the Islamic State’s Dabiq and Rumiyah dating from 2010-2017, will be 
analyzed to gain insight into the type of education being put out to radicalize and “train” lone 
actors to commit acts of terrorism. While the overall threat is small, but not negligible, Western 
Europe is shown to be under a far greater threat than that of the United States. Western Europe, 
due to a number of political and geographical reasons, is more at risk of organized group attacks 
than the United States while small, homegrown terrorism pose a greater threat to the United 
States. This research presents an accurate threat-assessment of two main types of attacks of 
Salafist terrorism in order to cut through political and media hyperbole and give future 


















A Nice, Nonviolent Person  
On November 28, 2016, A crisp, late-autumn day at The Ohio State University was 
violently interrupted by a crash, screams, and three gunshots. Abdul Razak Ali Artan, an 
eighteen-year-old Somali transfer student, drove a 
Honda Civic into the courtyard of Watts Hall on The 
Ohio State University’s Columbus campus. After 
striking students and faculty in the courtyard, Artan 
emerged from the vehicle brandishing a butcher’s 
knife and attacked confused and fleeing students and 
faculty. Ohio State police officer Alan Horujko, who 
was responding to a gas leak near Watts Hall, shot 
and killed Artan within a minute of the start of the 
attack. Artan was the only involved person killed 
and 11 others were injured with only one being placed in critical condition.1 
Shortly after the attack, the Islamic State claimed responsibility and even did a feature on Artan 
in their fourth edition of their online magazine Rumiyah2. Figure 1 showcases the article. Artan, 
however, had no direct affiliation with the Islamic State and their claim of him is nothing more 
than an attempt to raise fear and maintain their relevance. Despite this, Artan, his radicalization, 
                                                
1 Staff, WLWT Digital. “Terrorism Suspected in Car-and-Knife Attack at Ohio State.” WLWT, 
January 4, 2017. https://www.wlwt.com/article/active-shooter-alert-issued-by-ohio-state-
university/8371592. 





and his attack is representative of the “lone wolf” phenomena that has emerged in the United 
States and Western Europe.  
 Artan and his family immigrated to the United States in 2014 after being vetted by the 
State Department and found themselves in Dallas, Texas. The Catholic Charities of Dallas 
helped the family of eight (a single mother and seven children) adjust to the United States by 
providing language and job skills.3 The family then moved to Columbus, Ohio for unknown 
reasons after just 23 days in Dallas. David Woodward, the CEO of the Catholic Charities of 
Dallas, claimed there was nothing unusual in the family’s file that would indicate potential 
radical or violent activity.4 After moving to Columbus, Artan attended Columbus State 
Community College, graduated cum laude, and then moved to The Ohio State University for the 
Autumn 2016 semester. No report from Columbus State indicated disciplinary or behavioral 
issues.5  
 However, with less than a week into his first semester at Ohio State, Artan began to feel 
isolated from what he perceived as a result of his Islamic faith. Artan was interviewed by the 
school newspaper The Lantern in a segment called “Humans of Ohio State.”6 In the interview, 
Artan had this to say. 
“I just transferred from Columbus State. We had prayer rooms, like actual rooms where 
we could got to pray because we Muslims have to pray five times a day… This place 
[Ohio State] is huge, and I don’t event know where to pray. I wanted to pray in the open, 
                                                
3 CNN, Darran Simon. “Ohio State Attacker Said He Was ‘scared’ to Pray in Public.” CNN. 
Accessed November 30, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/28/us/ohio-state-attacker-abdul-
razak-ali-artan/index.html. 
4 CNN, “Ohio State Attacker Said He Was ‘scared’ to Pray in Public.” 
5 CNN, “Ohio State Attacker Said He Was ‘scared’ to Pray in Public.” 
6 CNN, “Ohio State Attacker Said He Was ‘scared’ to Pray in Public.” 
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but I was kind of scared with everything going on in the media. I’m a Muslim, its not 
what the media portrays me to be. If people looks at me, a Muslim praying, I don’t know 
what they’re going to think, what’s going to happen.”7 
Despite what appears to be a very self-aware and innocent thought-process of American-
Muslim relations, Artan grew increasingly discontent with the treatment of Muslims at the hands 
of the United States and cited atrocities like the treatment of Muslims of Myanmar on his social 
media accounts.8 In addition, Artan’s claim that Ohio State was not accommodative to Muslims 
with prayer rooms is blatantly false. Mahamud Kassin, a graduate from Ohio State in 2014, 
commented on Artan’s claim, “It’s a nonsense excuse. Every library has a place where you can 
worship.”9 Shortly before the attack, Artan posted this message on his Facebook account.  
  
“In the name of Allah, the most merciful and most gracious.  
 (Screenshot this before it gets deleted) 
My brothers and sisters, I am sick and tired of seeing my fellow Muslims brother 
and sisters being filled and tortured EVERYWHERE. Seeing my fellow Muslims being 
tortured, raped and killed in Burma led to a boiling point. I can’t take it anymore. 
 
America! Stop interfering with other countries, especially the Muslim Ummah. We are 
not weak. We are not weak, remember that.  
 
If you want us Muslims to stop carrying out lone wolf attacks, then make peace with 
‘dawla in al sham.’ Make a pact or a treaty with them where you promise to leave them 
alone, you and your apostate allies.  
 
                                                
7 Pan, Jay, and iker. “From the Archives: Ohio State Attacker Featured in ‘Humans of Ohio 
State.’” The Lantern. Accessed November 30, 2018. https://www.thelantern.com/2016/11/from-
the-archives-ohio-state-attacker-featured-in-humans-of-ohio-state/. 
8 CNN, “Ohio State Attacker Said He Was ‘scared’ to Pray in Public.” 
9 Smith, Mitch, Rukmini Callimachi, and Richard Pérez-Peña. “ISIS Calls Ohio State University 




By allah, we will not let you sleep unless you give peace to the Muslims. You will not 
celebrate or enjoy any holiday. 
 
Stop the killing of the Muslims in Burma. 
 
Btw, every single Muslim who disapproves of my actions is a sleeper cell, waiting for a 
signal. I am warning you. Oh America! 
 
And, a message to the Muslims, don’t listen to celebrity scholars who sold their deen. I 
am talking to the likes of Yasir Qadhi, Omar Sulieman, Nouman, Mufti Menk and the list 
goes on. Beware of the Al-Maghrib institute. Listen instead to our hero imam Anwar Al-
Awlaki. 
 
Let me ask you this questions, if the Muhammad peace and blessings upon him and his 
Shahaba were here today, wouldn’t Western media call them terrorists? 
 
To conclude,  
 
By Allah, I am willing to kill a billion infidels in retribution for a single DISABLED 
Muslim/Muslima  
 
(Screenshot this before it gets deleted)”10 
 
Artan’s epithet is more of a mess of incoherent ramblings rather than any devotion to a 
particular ideology or terrorist organization. In addition, the Islamic State’s claim is really 
baseless since Artan mentions Anwar al-Awlaki, a prominent Al-Qaeda scholar, in his Facebook 
post. Despite what appears to be nothing more than a general anger and frustration based in 
hyperbolic assumptions, Artan’s case is representative of the phenomena of lone wolf attacks. 
This “quiet, intelligent, young man… the kind of guy who knows his content before class”11  
ultimately came out of nowhere and it was only through the swift response from law 
enforcement no innocent people were killed in this attack.  
                                                
10 Menahan, Chris. “Read the Full Text of Somali Refugee Terrorist Abdul Razak Ali Artan’s 
Facebook Rant.” InformationLiberation. Accessed November 30, 2018. 
http://www.informationliberation.com/?id=55900. 
11 Smith, Callimachi, and Pérez-Peña, “ISIS Calls Ohio State University Attacker a ‘Soldier.’” 
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One Blue Suitcase 
On May 22, 2017, a conglomerate of young children, their parents, and fans of pop music 
enjoyed themselves at Ariana Grande’s Dangerous Woman tour at the Manchester Area when a 
blast shook the entire venue.12 A twenty-two year old British Libyan Muslim named Salman 
Abedi in a suicide attack detonated a blue suitcase packed with homemade explosives, screws, 
and nails in the foyer of the arena. Twenty-two people were killed (not including the attacker), 
twelve of which were under the age of sixteen.13 In addition, as of May 2018, over 800 people 
have been declared casualties with injuries ranging from dismembered limbs to psychological 
trauma.14 The Islamic State quickly claimed responsibility of the attack because, unlike the Ohio 
State attacker15, Abedi had direct ties to the Islamic State and it has been determined he acted on 
behalf of the organization.  
Salman Abedi was born in 1994 to Libyan refugee parents in a Muslim household in the 
United Kingdom. Abedi had a relatively normal upbringing attending a boy’s school and Salford 
University before dropping out prior to the attack. Although he had a pleasant disposition and 
was described as “normal” and “friendly,”16 Abedi’s young adult life contained a number of red 
                                                
12 May 23, CBS/AP, 2017, and 12:45 Am. “UK Police: 22 Confirmed Dead after Terror Incident 
at Ariana Grande Concert.” Accessed November 30, 2018. 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ariana-grande-concert-manchester-arena-explosion/. 
13 Dearden, Lizzie. “The Real Reason Isis Is Claiming Responsibility for the Manchester 
Attack.” The Independent, May 23, 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/manchester-bombing-isis-responsibility-salman-abedi-ariana-grande-concert-shock-awe-
tactics-syria-a7752056.html. 
14 “Manchester Arena Attack: Bomb ‘injured More than 800’ - BBC News.” Accessed 
November 30, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-manchester-44129386. 
15 Dearden, “The Real Reason Isis Is Claiming Responsibility for the Manchester Attack.” 
16 Evans, Martin, Victoria Ward, Robert Mendick, Ben Farmer, Hayley Dixon, and Danny Boyle. 




flags. Abedi attended the Didsbery Mosque in Manchester where he reportedly made a “face of 
hate” after the Sheikh made a denouncement of terrorism.17 In addition, he made multiple trips in 
2011 to Libya with his father to assist in the fight to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi. In the 
ensuing breakdown of the country, Abedi made a number of contacts with the Islamic State 
affiliate Katibat al-Batter al-Libi. It has been assessed by British intelligence officials that Abedi 
underwent explosives training at the hands of the Islamic State affiliate.18 
 Abedi made multiple movements with the blue suitcase around Manchester in the four 
days leading up to the attack according to Greater Manchester Police. In addition to the contacts 
made in Libya, Libyan dissidents from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group lived in close 
proximity to Abedi’s residence. Among the dissidents was Abd al-Baset Azzouz who ran a 
resistance movement in Libya under the command of Ayman al-Zawahiri and was an expert in 
bomb making. Dr. Syndey Alfrod, an explosives engineer and chairman of Alford technologies, 
concluded that the training Abedi is assumed to have received could have allowed him to build 
the homemade bomb in as little as four days. Shortly following the attack, the following excerpt 
appeared in the Islamic States propaganda magazine Rumiyah. 
 
“On the 27th of Sha’ban, one of the soldiers of the Khilafah detonated an explosive device 
in the midst of a gathering of Crusaders in the British city of Manchester at a shameless 
                                                
17 Evans et al., “Everything We Know about Manchester Suicide Bomber Salman Abedi.” 





concert at Manchester Arena, killing approximately 30 Crusaders and wounding 70 
others.”19 
 
 Salman Abedi’s attack on the Manchester Arena is representative of the other major type 
of phenomena discussed in this project: attacks carried out and supported by an organization or 
its representatives. In addition, many of the red flags that characterized Abedi as well as the 
tactics of the attack are more distinct to attacks carried out by organizations like the Islamic 
State.  
Looking Forward 
 Both Artan and Abedi’s attacks fall under the label of terrorism. However, the error in 
applying such a label is that it is too general to come up with an effective counter-strategy due to 
the vastly different nature of the attacks. In terms of perpetrators, Artan was vetted by the U.S. 
State Department, had a good disposition, and seemed to be on the way to advance his own 
station within the United States. He had no known contact with any representatives of terrorist 
organizations and was by and large radicalized on his own despite attending an inclusive college 
campus. Abedi, on the other hand, was the child of refugees who returned to their home country 
of Libya to assist in the civil war. He participated in violence with his father, exhibited signs of 
irrational behavior and hate, and was known to be in the company of jihadists, dissidents, and 
representatives of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. In terms of their tactics, Artan had very little. 
The methods of his attack, although not uncommon in recent terror attacks, showed little 
planning or long term end-goal. He prophesied no coherent ideology and seemed to act 
                                                
19 “Military and Covert Operations.” Rumiyah, 2017, Issue 10 (34).  
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impulsively. Abedi, however, received meticulous training and devoted much time and energy to 
the execution of his plan. In addition, the advanced nature of using a bomb instead of a vehicle 
increased the likelihood of causalities, especially since he had to be the one to ignite it.  
 Although Abedi’s attack was clearly more devastating than Artan’s, a trend that will 
become clearer as this project develops differences between organized and lone wolf attacks, 
Abedi’s attack was far more preventable relative to Artan’s. The “out-of-the-blue” nature of 
Artan’s attack provides it with a potential lethality that Abedi’s lacked. In addition, Artan’s 
attack breaks the mold of conventional terrorism as his lack of defined goal and ramblings make 
his attack more criminal in nature than a form of warfare. It is these discrepancies in these 
attacks that this project will develop and showcase an accurate threat assessment. In doing so, 
one type of attack will be determined as the greater threat to the regions of the Untied States and 
















 In 2004, an online publication titled The Call of Global Islamic Resistance began 
circulating on the internet in .PDF files in the Middle East and in the more radical sects of the 
Islamic world. The book, a massive 1,604-page treatise, was written by a revolutionary jihadist 
named Abu Musab al-Suri who had begun his writing as far back as 1990. Al-Suri’s thesis is 
centered around the gap that had formed between the reality of the Muslim community and his 
vision of a restored Islamic hegemony and his strategy for achieving such an aim.20 There are a 
few basic assumptions al-Suri makes that allow him to draw the conclusion of violent jihad such 
as a New World Order established by a Crusader-Zionist alliance in the post-Gulf War era and 
that current Muslim political organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, rulers like Sadaam 
Hussein, and armed organizations like the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) had either acquiesced to 
this New World Order or would inevitably fail given their current strategy.21 With these 
assumptions established, al-Suri spends the rest of his time developing a new strategy that shifted 
the battlefield to one of both open-fronts and ideas. 
 Al-Suri’s Call to Global Islamic Resistance details three main schools of strategy: 
movement, open-fronts, and individual jihad. Rather than structure his resistance movement as a 
pyramid, characteristic of standard hierarchical organizations, al-Suri organized his movement in 
the shape of concentric circles branching out from a small central circle dedicated to 
orchestrating the movement to the largest circle made up of independent cells with no connection 
to the organization. Al-Suri states, “In this way each participant in resistance operations may be 
                                                
20 Ryan, Michael. Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. Columbia 
University Press, 2016. (212) 
21 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. (206-7) 
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traced to one thing called ‘the global Islamic resistance’ where the actions of the whole 
maximizes the benefit of individual operations. Moreover, the arrest of individuals does not 
result in the arrest of all because there is no connection among them”.22 This model theoretically 
guarantees a fail-safe that the defeat of one arm of the movement, either in open battle or the 
takedown of key leaders, does not hinder the overall resistance carried out by individuals around 
the world. In addition, since al-Suri’s model of resistance is supposed to encompass the global 
Muslim community, attacks on countries around the world are predicated on the reliance on the 
outermost circle; the leaderless jihad that could repeatedly strike and exhaust the Crusader-
Zionist alliance at home.23 While his strategic theory did not manifest itself exactly, al-Suri’s 
model for a global Islamic resistance would heavily influence Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in 
their endeavors to reestablish Islamic hegemony by attacking the Western world.  
 While much of the fighting al-Suri describes in his book is centered on open-front battles 
in the Middle East, the role Western counties play in ‘oppressing’ the Muslim world is not lost 
on the leaders of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The U.S. citizen turned Al-Qaeda spokesman 
Anwar al-Awlaki states, “There is no rolling back of the worldwide jihadi movement… America 
as a whole has turned into a nation of evil… We will fight back and incite others to do the 
same”.24  In a letter addressed to the American people seized in the May 1st raid on Bin Laden’s 
compound, Bin Laden writes, “Our jihad against you [the American people] is worship… Justice 
is the strongest army and security is the best way of life, but it slipped out of your grasp the day 
                                                
22 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. (210) 
23 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. (211) 
24 Awlaki, Anwar. “Message to the American People and Muslims in the West.” Inspire, 2010. 
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you made the Jews victorious in occupying our lands”.25 Finally, Islamic State Caliph Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi stated, “Islam was never a religion of peace. Islam is the religion of fighting. No-
one should believe that the war that we are waging is the war of the Islamic State. It is the war of 
all Muslims, but the Islamic State is spearheading it. It is the war of Muslims against infidels."26 
For the leaders and scholars of Salafist motivated jihad, attacking the West is not only justified, 
but a moral duty.  
 This project will take an in-depth look at the attacks of Salafist jihad organizations 
against the United States and Western Europe: namely attacks planned and committed by the 
organizations themselves and attacks committed by so-called “lone wolves.” The goal is to 
ultimately conclude an accurate threat assessment of each type of attack within the United States 
and Western Europe and which type poses more of a threat to each respective region. Before 
delving further into this topic, a few parameters for the research must be established. First, this 
project only gathered data on Salafist groups whose ideology and motivation for jihad falls under 
the auspices of the aforementioned Call to Global Islamic Jihad. Therefore, nationalist groups 
like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Taliban, were not considered part of the data set. Second, this 
project only looked at attacks committed within the United States and Western Europe in the 
post 9/11 era, although some trends that are cited include attacks prior to 9/11/2001. Third, 
“Lone wolf” is a popular, yet confusing term. For this project, homegrown terrorist will be used 
instead of “lone wolf” and will describe individuals radicalized on the internet or through some 
other medium and act by themselves or small groups. They cannot have any official support or 
                                                
25 Francis, David. “Here’s Osama Bin Laden’s Letter to the American People – Foreign Policy.” 
Accessed March 19, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/20/heres-osama-bin-ladens-letter-
to-the-america n-people/.  
26 “IS Releases ‘Al-Baghdadi Message,’” May 14, 2015, sec. Middle East. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32744070. 
	 13	
representation from a jihadi organization prior to the attack (prior is emphasized due to 
organizations’ tendencies to claim attackers after the fact for media noise when in reality they 
had no affiliation). Lastly, while certain political policies will be cited, this project will not take 























 Olivier Roy states that Salafism “was originally meant to answer the challenge of the 
West. But “Salafi” no longer refers to a global political project to reform and modernize Muslim 
societies. The idea is to ignore the West.”27 As was previously stated, this project analyses 
Salafist-inspired violence and the type of threats it poses to the United States and Western 
Europe. Since the 9/11 attacks in New York City, Salafist violence has come to the U.S. and 
Western Europe in the form of organized or sponsored attacks and individuals radicalized 
through organizational propaganda. The two largest, and most infamous, perpetrators of these 
attacks in the post-9/11 era have been Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In order to properly 
analyze the type of threat that impacts the U.S. and Western Europe, a proper understanding of 
the history, capabilities, limitations, attack history, and propaganda of these organizations must 
be gained.  
 
History, Composition, and Strength  
Al-Qaeda 
 Ayman al-Zawahiri was a man who lived his life into two spheres: medicine and jihad. 
Although his medical career economically sustained him, the Egyptian had studied and 
participated in the concept of violent jihad for most of his adult life.28 Zawahiri dedicated himself 
to the cause of overthrowing the Egyptian government based on the writings of Salafist theorist 
                                                
27 Leiken, Robert S. Europe’s Angry Muslims: The Revolt of the Second Generation. 1st ed. 
Oxford University Press, 2011. 65 
28 Ryan, Michael. Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. Columbia 
University Press, 2016. 54 
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Sayyid Qutb, who argued that true patriotism and allegiance is to an Islamic authority, which 
justifies violent overthrow of a secular regime.29 Framed and imprisoned by the Egyptian 
government for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Zawahiri was released in 
1985 and worked his way to Pakistan to assist in the resistance against Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan during the Afghan war. It his here where he came across a young, militant, and 
wealthy Saudi man named Osama Bin Laden.30 
Osama Bin Laden founded the original Al-Qaeda in 1988, which consisted of only 30 
original members coming out of the Afghan war with the Soviet Union. Bin Laden saw Al-
Qaeda as a way to continue the fight of the Afghan war (symbolically against imperialist and 
anti-Islamic forces) in the global arena.31 Zawahiri and Bin Laden soon formed a close bond over 
their shared goals and desire to forego worldly desires and wealth in favor of a more 
idealistically driven life. Both men decided to go their own ways to pursue the common goal of 
“global jihad.”  
Osama Bin Laden traveled back to his home country of Saudi Arabia in 1990 and urged 
the Saudi government to allow him to lead a jihad against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. He was 
infuriated when Saudi Arabia decided to invite a coalition of Western states led by the United 
States into Muslim holy land to do this work instead. Bin Laden fled to Sudan in 1992, but was 
not able to stay long as complaints of his terrorist activities caused the Saudi government to 
revoke his citizenship in 1994. Bin Laden then fled to Pakistan and in 1996 declared a global 
jihad against the United States and the “Judeo-Crusader Alliance.”  Zawahiri was also having 
trouble in his own jihad. Having been expelled from Sudan and having little luck in Central Asia, 
                                                
29 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. 36 
30 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. 54 
31 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. 52 
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Zawahiri traveled back to Pakistan and the two men reunited once again to coalesce their efforts 
into the “World Islamic Front Against the Jews and Crusaders” or the modern-day Al-Qaeda.  
Bin Laden held an immense amount of respect for Zawahiri and heeded his advice for 
how to steer the helm of the organization. Zawahiri, in turn, acted as Bin Laden’s physician and 
ceded command of the organization to him. However, it should be noted that neither man held 
any sort of degree in Islamic theology; they were amateurs. Rather, their authority seen by those 
Muslims who actively and tacitly supported the organization was seen more in their symbolic 
resistance to anti-Islamic doctrine perpetrated by Western and Middle Eastern governments.32 
Al-Qaeda’s attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and New York City in 2001 indicated that they 
expected the fight against the United States would occur in a similar fashion to that of the Soviet 
Union. However, The U.S. success at forging allies in the Middle East and toppling the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan (a safe haven for Al-Qaeda) shortly after the 9/11 attacks, forced Al-
Qaeda to adjust their doctrine.33 
This change in doctrine was seen best in Zawahiri’s publication Knights Under the 
Prophet’s Banner, which he wrote in 2001. One of the major strategic implications for Al-Qaeda 
was seen in how Zawahiri detailed the future of the jihadist movement in the following excerpt.    
 
The answer is simple: all movements witness a process of erosion and renewal but the 
general outcome is what determines the fate of the movement [whether] gradual 
disappearance or growth – and the Jihadist movement is growing and flourishing (by the 
grace of Allah).34 
                                                
32 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. 54-55 
33 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. 57 
34 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. 64 
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This statement essentially acts an argument against doubters of what Al-Qaeda is trying 
to do and achieve. It is a sort of internal reflection that Zawahiri has of his own mortality that 
acknowledges that this fight against the “Zionist-Crusader Alliance” may not unravel the same 
way as the resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did a little more than a decade 
earlier. Bin Laden may be killed in the process, Zawahiri may also be killed in process, and Al-
Qaeda as an organization might be defeated, but the spirit of jihad and the movement of 
resistance is something that ebbs and flows and cannot be stopped.35  
However, Zawahiri and Bin Laden were not so foolish to die this early on in their 
movement. They decided to separate the Al-Qaeda leadership, termed Al-Qaeda Central or AQC, 
from the operational Al-Qaeda cells scattered throughout the world. This is clearly reminiscent 
of al-Suri’s Call to Global Islamic Resistance. While the organization is still hierarchical, the 
less connection between each level helps secure the survivability of the organization if one part 
should be compromised. A number of tactical recommendations started to emerge from AQC to 
operational cells in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, Somalia, and Nigeria.  
 
Striving to cause the largest losses on the opponent and inflict the greatest number of 
casualties – no matter how much the preparation for these kinds of operations costs in 
terms of effort and time – because this is the language the West understands… 
Concentrating on suicide [martyrdom] operations because they are the most successful 
method of inflicting damage on the opponent with the fewest losses to the mujahedeen.36 
                                                
35 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. 64 
36 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. 81 
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 Such tactics are clear departures from the U.S. sponsored open warfare conducted against 
the Soviet Union. In addition, it allows a level of autonomous decision making by each 
operational Al-Qaeda cell to choose targets and methods of attack given their individual 
capabilities and limitations while keeping the senior leadership separate from operational risk. 
Despite successful strikes throughout Europe and some Middle Eastern states in the mid-2000s – 
mid-2010s. Al-Qaeda was never fully able to recover from the U.S. response to 9/11. The 
invasion and pacification of Iraq, constant U.S. presence in Afghanistan, the assassination of 
Osama Bin Laden (Al-Qaeda’s orator and symbolic leader), and the break and eventual 
overshadowing by the Islamic State have kept Al-Qaeda from duplicating the scale of the 9/11 
attacks and achieve further strategic progress of removing the West from the Middle East.37  
However, it should be noted that despite such setbacks, Al-Qaeda as of 2019 has not 
disappeared. According to the New York Times, Al-Qaeda affiliated cells still exist in more than 
two dozen countries and were involved in ricin plots in both France and Germany in 2018 that 
were interdicted by authorities before coming to fruition.38 In addition, the most recent National 
Defense Strategy published by the Trump administration stated that Al-Qaeda “remains resilient 
and poses an enduring threat to the homeland and United States interests around the world.”39 
 
                                                
37 Ryan, Decoding Al Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America. 256 
38 Schmitt, Eric. “ISIS May Be Waning, but Global Threats of Terrorism Continue to Spread.” 
The New York Times, July 8, 2018, sec. World. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/world/middleeast/isis-global-terrorism.html. 
39 Landler, Mark, and Eric Schmitt. “Terrorist Threat ‘More Fluid and Complex Than Ever,’ 




The Islamic State 
 In 2004, a 113-page article titled Idarat al Tawahhush or The Management of Savagery: 
The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Ummah will Pass found an audience with one of 
Iraq’s most dangerous criminals, Abu Musad al-Zarqawi. This text detailed tactics for success in 
the modern jihadi struggle such as disruption and exhaustion through terror tactics, highly visible 
violence to send a message to both allies and enemies, and empowerment by conquering land as 
a unifier of forces.40 Zarqawi became the leader of what was known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI 
and began to implement such tactics against both coalition forces and indiscriminate Muslim 
civilians. His tactics, however, put Zarqawi at odds with the Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership who 
considered his tactics more detrimental to their cause than helpful.41 Zarqawi was killed in an 
airstrike in 2006 and AQI slowly disbanded and morphed into a new organization known as the 
Islamic State in Iraq or ISI, still experiencing setback after setback as the U.S. troop surge of 
2007-2008 and Sunni Awakening stabilized the country. However, in 2010, a new man named 
Ibrahim Awwad Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai who used the nom de guerre Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
ascended to the leadership of ISI.42  
According to J.M. Berger and Jessica Stern, Baghdadi was born in 1971 to a Sunni-Arab 
family in the city of Samarra and his family was believed to be directly descended from the 
Prophet Muhammad.43 He studied at the Islamic University in Baghdad and received a doctorate 
in Islamic Culture and Sharia Law. Described as “quiet” and “conservative” by his peers, 
Baghdadi took up the struggle of jihad when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. He was 
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captured by the U.S. in 2004 and released in 2007. He then began recruiting former Ba’athists, 
who were unemployed as a result of de-Ba’athification.44 The Arab Spring in 2011 provided ISI 
the perfect opportunity to capitalize on the sectarian tensions and porous border between Iraq and 
Syria. Still under the leadership of Al-Qaeda Central, Baghdadi sent operatives into Syria to 
seize on the instability there which then turned into the group known as Jabhat al-Nusra. On 
April 9, 2013, Baghdadi announced a merger between Al-Nusra and ISI, creating the Islamic 
State (IS), which troubled both the leadership of Al-Qaeda and Al-Nusra. What was supposed to 
be an alliance turned into a war between the IS and Al-Nusra, with IS being much more effective 
at conquering and holding territory. On February 2nd 2014, Al-Qaeda officially broke with and 
denounced IS.45 IS was now on its own and and gaining serious momentum as it steamrolled 
across the deserts of Iraq and Syria, eventually capitalizing on the insurrection and poor training 
of the Iraqi military units stationed in Mosul, a city of 1.5 million people. In early June 2014, IS 
captured the city and Baghdadi emerged on the pulpit of the Mosul mosque to declare a new 
caliphate and encourage all Muslims to participate in this new utopia.46 
The Islamic State operated on a loosely based hierarchical model that relied on a series of 
provincial governors and feedback loops from citizens without democratic processes. This was 
advantageous to IS in two ways. The first is that the provincial system of administration allowed 
a level of autonomy to carry out operations unique to each area and that the organization as a 
whole could survive a leadership decapitation of Baghdadi.47 The second is that the feedback 
loops allows administrators to poll constituents and make calls on what needs to be changed and 
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what can be ignored without sacrificing hierarchical power. Such operational autonomy and 
feedback allowed the Islamic State to use so called “smart mobs” to help recruit from the West. 
These mobs were supporters and “jihad hobbyists” who cheered the success of IS and tried to 
recruit outsiders to its message on the internet and social media platforms with little direction 
from IS senior leadership or actual risk to themselves due to internet anonymity. As long as they 
adhered and propagated the ideology, these online mobs could translate IS propaganda into 
Western languages, make calls for violence, and create twitter bots to amplify their media’s 
reach.48 As of January 2015, a peak in IS’s forces, foreign fighters were estimated to be 
numbered at 20,700 (about 40% of the organization’s total strength) with over 4000 coming from 
Western European countries.49 
 As the Islamic State’s expansion began to slow and eventually be rolled back, the nature 
of their operations changed. In late 2014, IS’s social media presence began to falter with 42% of 
all IS affiliated Twitter accounts being taken offline.50 In addition, the international infamy IS 
gained caused a fear of spy infiltration into the organization. Entry into the proto-state began to 
slow as it soon became a requirement for immigrants to have some form of inside contact to 
vouch for their entry and all laptops, cell phones, and passports were seized upon entry.51 The 
nature of IS’s propaganda began to change as well from calls for immigration and celebration of 
military victories in their online publication Dabiq to a more global identity approach and call 
for terror attacks in home countries in Dabiq’s successor Rumiyah.52  
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 J.M. Berger states, “The 2014 surge in the number of jihadist foreign fighters and 
inspired lone-wolf attacks was attributable, at least in part, to a revolution in the style and content 
of messaging that ISIS had deliberately pursued”.53 However, despite successful attacks in 
Western countries, the Islamic State sold itself too well and overplayed its hand in its military 
operations. Many foreign fighters, especially from Western Europe, came with little to no 
experience in military tactics, weapons handling, local language skills, or regional geographic 
knowledge. Yet, according to West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, over 89% of those who 
immigrated from 2011-2014 desired to be conventional fighters (the exact people who would 
need such skills).54 Instead, many found themselves used as cannon fodder or suicide bombers in 
military operations with extremely high casualty rates such as the Battle of Kobane, which saw 
over 200 foreign fighters killed for zero strategic value.55 In addition to this unsustainable 
military strategy, the intervention of foreign governments, mainly the United States and Russia 
in support of Iraqi and Syrian forces respectively (but not together), saw IS territory began to 
slowly be rolled back. On July 10, 2017, Mosul was retaken by Iraqi forces and on October 17, 
2017, IS’s capital Raqqa fell to Syrian forces. Iraq was declared completely free of IS control on 
December 9th, 2017 and on December 19th, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that the 
Islamic State had been defeated and he was preparing to withdraw American forces from Syria 
despite small insurgent pockets remaining in some cities.56 
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Organized Attack Statistics 
 The following data is derived from the Global Terrorism Database published by the 
University of Maryland. The following criteria was used in the data collection. All of the attacks 
took place between 2001 (including the 9/11 attacks) up through 2017 and included all countries 
in North America and Western Europe with casualty figures includin both wounded and killed. 
Figure 3 showcases all of the following criteria in from which the data set was collected. 57 
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 The Global Terrorism Database analysis resulted in 39 organized attacks from the 
preceding data. It is important to note that some attacks that are often regarded as a single 
incident due to their date were divided by each “strike” that occurred within the date. For 
instance, the 9/11 attacks were divided into 3 separate attacks for each World Trade Center tower 
and the Pentagon. That being said, 24 of the attacks were committed by Al-Qaeda or their 
regional affiliates and the other 15 were committed by the Islamic State and their affiliates. The 
first major Islamic State attack occurred in Brussels, Belgium on May 24, 2014. There was only 
one Al-Qaeda attack after that which was the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris on January 7th, 2015. 
Figure 458 showcases line graphs of attacks over time by attack type and region.  
                                                








 The majority of attacks occurred in Europe which, along with various other factors and 
European state government policies, will be discussed in Chapter 2. In addition, outside of the 
9/11 attacks, an anomaly that will be discussed in Chapter 3, more casualties occurred in Europe 
as a result of the greater frequency of organized attacks. Finally, it is important to note that the 
attacks in the Global Terrorism Database analysis fell under the aforementioned definition of 
organized attacks. Homegrown terrorist attacks were not represented due to the ambiguous 
nature of the attacks in terms of whether or not the individual was acting under the direction or 
education of an organization. In addition, homegrown terrorist attacks often lack a coherent 
strategy or political end-goal, making them not much more than standard crime. Homegrown 
terrorists, however, are not to be ignored. The following section is going to explore the type of 
information presented to individuals who are vulnerable to be convinced to commit homegrown 
style attacks in the West.  
 
Western Violence in Propaganda  
As J.M. Berger states in his book, ISIS: The State of Terror, the Islamic State was a 
“daring experiment in the power of horror, but also in the marketing of a utopia.”59 Brutal acts 
such as the beheading of American journalist James Foley or the burning of the Jordanian pilot 
Muath al-Kasasbeh were captured on camera in gruesome detail and circulated on social media 
sites and the Islamic State’s online magazine Dabiq. Given that Westerners are used to a less 
violent world, the display of such acts is no accident. Dabiq (and the Islamic State’s later 
publication Rumiyah) intentionally displayed such acts to cause horror and revile amongst 
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Western readers.60 It existed as a way to brag and display their capabilities, while also striking 
fear into such readers.  
In addition to displaying acts of brutality, both the Islamic State’s Dabiq and Al-Qaeda’s 
Inspire contained specific 
calls for violence against the 
West. One of the ways both 
publications accomplished this 
was through the celebration of 
martyrs who committed terror 
attacks in Western countries 
whether they be lone wolf or 
organized terror attacks. 
Figure 5 shows pages from 
Dabiq and Inspire6162. In the 
Dabiq article, the images of many men who committed terror attacks are seen, such as the 
security photo of axe-wielding Zale Thompson who was radicalized on the internet to attack 
NYPD officers in Queens.63 The image in Inspire shows Boston Marathon bomber Tamerlon 
Tsarnaev. Both images from each issue are also filled with words such as “heroes” and “knights” 
and demonize the West as “crusaders” (a label that will be discussed later). The glorification of 
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such individuals, often with endearing photographs, supports the idea that attacking the West in 
their home countries is just as honorable as immigrating to fight in the Middle East.  
 Robert VandenBerg, on behalf of The Ohio State University’s Sociology department, 
conducted an academic endeavor titled the Project on Radicalism in Social Media. His research, 
which I participated in as a research assistant, analyzed Al-Qaeda’s publication Inspire and the 
Islamic State’s publications Dabiq and Rumiyah and codified every single page within each 
publication into a data set in order to find out how these organizations justify their violence on 
religious, legalistic, moralistic, and various other grounds that resulted in 1486 entries. However, 
it is important to note that some of the articles were entered multiple times by multiple 
researchers in order to gain a consistent picture of the articles. The following information about 
the publications of Inspire, Dabiq, and Rumiyah is derived from this data set. Ultimately, the 
data set was used to find various themes that would possibly inspire and push an individual to 
commit violence against Western countries. Since much of the material coded dealt with topics 
surrounded local (Middle Eastern) conflict, not every aspect of the data set was used.   
One of the major themes analyzed in the publications was whether or not an article 
mentioned or dealt with the theme of the conquering of Western Europe and North America. 
This is extremely pertinent to this research because this is one of the most overt themes 
pertaining to Islamic violence in the West. Out of 
1486 entries into the dataset, only 86 entries 
touched the theme or mentioned conquering the 
West. Of those 86 entries, 39 were from Dabiq 
and 47 were from Inspire.64 One of the 
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more striking examples of this theme is a simple image of former U.S. President Barack Obama 
looking solemn as he walks past memorials of fallen U.S. soldiers in Figure 6.65  
Another category in relation to this theme of conquering is that world domination. 
Although not unique to Western countries, the theme of world domination would obviously 
include the West. 137 entries were found to contain the theme or mention of world domination. 
Unlike the category of conquering the West, Dabiq contained more entries (84) than Inspire (53). 
This can be due to a number of reasons the first of which being the aforementioned expansionist 
nature of the Islamic State. Since the Islamic State was more set on expanding on anyone in their 
way and made little differentiation between secular Middle Eastern governments and the West. 
Given their objectives, it makes since that global domination would be more prevalent in their 
propaganda rather than singling out Western countries. Al-Qaeda, especially under Osama Bin 
Laden, dealt more with the concept of the “far” enemy being the United States and other Western 
governments that were propping up Middle Eastern regimes. In addition to this emphasis, 
“conquering” in the eyes of Al-Qaeda publishers may not mean domination but rather just defeat 
of Western states to the point of their removal from the Middle East.66  
 The term “crusader” has been used in jihadist propaganda as a way to demonize and 
categorize Western militaries or supporters of Western governments by using the label of the 
European knights that attempted to take back Jerusalem from the Islamic Empire during the 
Middle Ages. Within the context of the data set, “crusader” was noted as a term to dehumanize 
people of Western states and militaries and, in turn, justify violence against them. Out of 1436 
entries, “crusader” was found in 345 entries. Dabiq contained a majority of the entries with 236 
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and Inspire contained 109 of the entries.67 The way in which the term “crusader” is used in 
Dabiq is particularly evident of its intent to demonize and justify violence against Westerners. 
The following quote from the preliminary founder of the Islamic State, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
is emblazoned in the “Contents” section of Dabiq.  
 “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s 
permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.”68 
 Immediately next to this is a depiction of defeated soldiers in Western military garb as 




 Further filtering of the data finds condemnations of democracy or democratic institutions, 
something inherently dominant in the West, as a way to justify violence. 161 entries, 82 from 
Dabiq and 79 from Inspire, are found to have centered around this theme as the main 
justification for violence.70 Another filter used in the data set was the justification of violence 
according to Islamic law, adding a level of sanctification to the acts themselves. A massive 452 
entries, more than one quarter of the entire data set, was found to be centered around this theme 
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with 216 from Dabiq and 236 from Inspire. This fairly even distribution can largely be attributed 
to the aforementioned fact that the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, had a 
Ph.D. in Islamic theology (something other jihadists like Zawahiri and Bin Laden lacked) and 
numerous clerics have written treatises, including the American Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki in Al-
Qaeda’s Inspire.71 
 The last major category applies to violence committed in Western countries is the tactical 
instruction sections found in publications. 
Only a small percentage of the publications 
(56 total entries) contained such information. 
This information is found in publications that 
occurred during times when both the Islamic 
State and Al-Qaeda were either in retreat or 
did not have the capabilities to mount large 
scale attacks and needed to outsource their violence to homegrown terrorists. Such articles are 
bolstered with identity-choice appeals and basic tactics.72 The overwhelming majority of the 
tactical instructions were in Al-Qaeda’s Inspire with 45 out of the 59 entries coming from 
publications. Inspire titled most of these sections as “Open-Source Jihad” that contained 
information how to make homemade bombs out of materials one can get from a hardware store 
or which blade is the most lethal for stabbing an individual as evidenced in Figure 8.73 However, 
it should be noted that such information is successful only to a limited point. Like the vast 
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majority of individuals in stressful situations, homegrown attackers sink to the level of their 
training (which is very little) rather than rise to the occasion.74 
 These derivations from 1436 entries from thousands of pages of Al-Qaeda and Islamic 
State propaganda is relevant to this research because it showcases the prevalence of the violence 
against Western nations in the information being presented. In addition, by using selective terms 
like “crusader” and dealing with themes of domination and conquering the West, the propaganda 
of these organization are able to paint a monolithic image of an evil civilization that which 
attacking is not only justified, but righteous. Overall, what is presented to potential recruits in 
Western countries is that of a celebration and encouragement of violence to be committed against 
Western countries on behalf of these organizations.  
This, combined with the history of the two main terrorist organizations (Al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic State), shows the capabilities and limitations that each organization and type of attack 
(organized and lone wolf) maintains. Given that Europe experienced the majority of the attacks 
from the Global Terrorism Database and is geographically closer to the operating area of these 
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 As was previously stated in the attack histories of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State from 
2001-2017, Western Europe was the recipient of the majority of the attacks relative to North 
America. One of the primary reasons behind this is simple geography. Europe’s close proximity 
to the Middle East has resulted in a long history of conflict and trade ranging from the crusades 
of the early Middle Ages to the colonial exploitations of the Sykes-Picot Agreement during the 
early 20th Century. In a debate presented by the American Enterprise Institute, Associate 
Sociology Professor Dr. Edward Crenshaw asserted that the influence of Western Civilization on 
the Middle East has created an identity crisis in Muslims and Islamic culture, resulting in the 
increased appeal of fundamentalist interpretations of Islam such as Salafism.75 Combine this with 
the destabilization of Middle Eastern states in the latter half of the 20th Century resulting in 
increased immigration and refugee populations to Europe and cultures, with a history of 
exploitation, in close proximity to one another can lead to conflict.   
 
The Great Muslim Minority 
 The latter half of the 20th Century saw an influx of immigrants and refugees beginning to 
enter Western Europe. Turkish immigrants were flooded into Germany as temporary workers in 
low-level factory jobs who decided to stay, Muslim immigration to France from former French 
colonies such as Mali and Algeria began since the fall of French colonialism in the 1950s and 
1960s, the United Kingdom has been a home to Pakistani immigrants since the ceded their 
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dominion over India and created the state of Pakistan (and later Bangladesh). 76 This created 
minority Muslim communities across Western Europe that faced racism, cultural suppression, 
and economic inequality. The start of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the fall of such states as Libya 
and civil wars in Tunisia and Syria have created a vast influx of refugees from the Middle East 
on top of Europe’s established Muslim minority communities. By 2015, nearly 1.3 million 
asylum seekers, a majority of them from Muslim countries, had entered Europe. 77 
 As of 2016, Muslims made up a total of 4.6% of Europe’s population. However, the 
distribution of Muslims across European states is not equal. Figure 9 showcases a timeline of 
asylum seekers to Europe as well as Muslim populations as percentages of individual countries. 
78 79  
Figure 9 
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 According to Pew Research, France and Germany have the largest percentages of Muslim 
populations in Western Europe. Europe’s total Muslim population increased over a whole 1 
percentage point from 2010-2016. One of the more striking differences in demographics outside 
of religion is that the average Muslim is 30 years old whereas the average European is 43 years 
old. This age disparity is largely due 
to the increased birth rates in Muslim 
communities relative to the declining 
birthrates in native European circles. 
In addition, 50% of all Muslims are 
under the age of 30 relative to only 
32% of Europeans.80 Figure 10 
showcases the growth as a factor of 
both fertility and migratory patterns.81 
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 Within this minority of Muslims that has established itself in European countries, there 
remains marked differences between the 1st generation of immigrants and that of their 2nd and 3rd 
generation offspring. The first generation immigrant is characterized by strong ties to their 
country of origin and its culture. In many cases, 1st generation immigrants come for temporary 
work and send their money back to their homeland to their larger families. However, through a 
variety of factors such as economic prospering or stagnation, political policies affecting 
migration in and out of the country, or (as in many cases, recently) political instability in their 
homeland causes these 1st generation immigrants to stay. Robert Leiken notes that Muslim 
immigrants in Europe have a tendency to form enclaves within European cities where they can 
maintain their cultural identity and protect themselves from potential racism in the broader 
community. As a result, there is not much of an effort apart on the 1st generation immigrants to 
integrate.82 It is these close ties to their homeland that ultimately give 1st generation immigrants a 
sort of silver lining to their own disparity in Europe. Their children, on the other hand, do not see 
it the same way. 
 Robert Leiken states, “Euro-jihadis are often, but not always, the offspring of labor 
migrants who began arriving in prosperous labor-short north-west Europe in the 1950s. Their 
offspring were raised in hardscrabble enclaves and faced social, cultural, and economic 
discrimination.”83 Leiken terms such offspring as “post migrants.” Post migrants are caught 
between two pulling civilizations, that of Europe and that of their homeland. They live in 
conservative homes but go to school and are educated in a liberal and secular world that seems 
blasphemous to the lessons taught at home. Post migrants are not fully integrated or accepted 
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into the ethnic circles European cultural identities, but at the same time don’t have the strong 
cultural ties to their homelands as their parents so they feel like they belong nowhere.84 The 
religious interpretation that their parents follow no longer appeals to them because it does not 
speak to their plight.  
Enter Salafism. The rigid and black and white version of Islam centered solely around 
conservative fundamentalist teaching of the Quran is a solution to the post migrant’s crisis. It 
eschews both the lifestyle of the European and their parents and encourages migration to the 
Holy Land for proper education. The black and white, right vs wrong teachings offer clear cut 
answers to the post migrant’s ambiguous world and offer a connection to God that needs no 
mediator outside the Quran itself.85 Combine these beliefs with their aforementioned disparity as 
well as images of Western intervention to fight others subscribing to this fundamentalist 
interpretation, then the post migrant can turn from a lost and suffering youth to a violent radical 
with purpose, community, and a desire for revenge. The countries of France, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany been the targets of many post-9/11 terror attacks and have some of the 
largest Muslim minority populations than other European countries. The following pages will 
examine their experience with each of their Muslim minority communities  
 
France 
 1st generation Muslim immigrants to France never intended on staying, so they never 
fully integrated. Their children, as a result, never learned to speak fluent Arabic and had to pick 
up French on the fly, which further separated them from their homeland and the world around 
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them.86 Post migrants in France are pulled by three forces: the criminal underworld, the state, or 
fundamentalist Islam. Each force offers its own sense of community and a way out of their 
current disparity. However, the only legitimate avenue (the state and labor markets) is heavily 
biased towards French natives. While often seen as inclusive policies, the lifestyles of lifetime 
employment, 35-hour work weeks, paid vacation, and healthcare are limited because an 
employer or the state can only afford to fill a certain number of positions. As a result, Robert 
Leiken states, “The result was a class system among workers… unionized workers, usually white 
and native, got steady jobs, even tenure, while immigrants and their offspring got short term 
jobs, if any.”87 Civil unrest in the form of riots took place across France in the mid 2000s and 
were populated by disillusioned Muslim youth.88 While it was later proven that militant Islamism 
was not a motivator and was instead the economic disparity, it is important to remember that 
such disparity is a contributing factor to a large component of the Muslim immigrants’ 
disillusionment.  
 Another concerning phenomena that was occurring in France around the time of the riots 
was a notable increase in fundamentalist Islamic practices in certain schools across the country. 
While not inherently bad in their own right, the practices that children began adhering to would 
interfere with their education and the curriculum of the schools themselves. A commission by the 
Inspector General of Education was sent to investigate this phenomenon. The commission found 
that young girls wearing veils in schools had done so “under constraint or a means of pressure on 
young women.” In addition, Ramadan fasting was seen to have been conducted by younger and 
younger students and done so with more emphasis on “personal mortification” and purity rather 
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than as a symbol of identity. Subjects taught such as history with a Judeo-Christian theme, 
science that did not include creationism, and gym class were rejected by these children.89 What 
was discovered was a cultural shift in the Islamic enclaves in France to more fundamental 
Salafism. Leiken notes, “The Salafist may down pizza and kebabs but he defies school rules and 
disparages diplomas… In the banlieue (Muslim enclaves), Salafism has some purchase in the 
second generation… in particular the unstable quartiers.”90 
 The economic disparity and cultural infiltration of Salafism in Muslim immigrant 
communities gives proper cause for their disillusionment of France. As previously mentioned, 
Salafism encourages migration to the Holy Land of Islam as a way of education and purity for 
the Salafist. The collapse of countries like Syria and groups Islamic State which encourage 
migration to live and fight for them found a definite audience in French Muslims. Dr. Peter 
Neumann found that nearly 1,200 of the 4,000 European Muslims that traveled to fight in Syria 
as of January 2015 were French, more than any other European country. France is now faced 
with the problem of large numbers of disillusioned French Muslims going to receive training and 
fight for radical groups like the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda. The real threat is what happens to 
these migrants and to France itself when these migrants try to return.  
 
United Kingdom 
 Like France, the Muslim minority population in the United Kingdom stems from the 
UK’s former colonial holdings such as Pakistan. In the United Kingdom, Muslims make up the 
largest immigrant cohort.91 What sets the United Kingdom apart from other European countries 
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is the militancy of its Muslim minority population. Leiken states, “British jihadis outnumber by 
an order of magnitude those of any of its continental neighbors.”92 This magnitude is no small 
sum either. The director of MI5, Jonathan Evans, stated in November 2007 that upwards of two-
thousand individuals were known to be involved in terrorist activity in the United Kingdom.93 In 
fact, the British Pakistani community has been used as a springboard by Al-Qaeda to recruit and 
commit attacks even in North America.94 
  This begs the question of how and why such a large community that supports organized 
terrorism has cropped up in the United Kingdom. Like France, much disparity occurs between 
the Muslim immigrant population and the rest of the native citizens, which resulted in enclaves 
rather than societal integration. In 2003, it was found that 13% of the Muslim population was 
unemployed compared to only 5% of native Britons. Only 50% of Muslims were calculated to be 
“economically active” and there was a sharp drop in female Muslim participation in the 
workforce. In addition, Muslim men constituted the lowest percentage of white collar 
professionals and 33.7% of Muslims in the workforce were in unskilled occupations, higher than 
any other demographic. Lastly, 41% of Muslims over 15 had no high school diploma and 40% 
live in overcrowded housing situations.95 
According to Robert Leiken, there is nothing to suggest that racism or Islamophobia is 
the primary reason for this disparity. Instead, Leiken found that the internal culture of these 
Muslim immigrant enclaves had a much larger influence over their economic outcomes.96 
Anthropologist Roger Ballard found that Muslim singularity in mortuary rites and marriage rules 
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“all reinforce the same tendency” that Muslim kinship networks not only inhibit the physical and 
social mobility of Muslim women but tend to be “tighter and focused more locally than Sikhs 
and Hindus.”97  
 Given that economic disparity exists between Muslim immigrant enclaves and the rest of 
society, where does the push to the Salafist ideology come in? It began in the 1990s with the 
invitation of extremist preachers into the country. These preachers, such as Abu Qatada (credited 
with inspiring the 9/11 hijackers) and Abdullah el Faisal (tutored Richard Reid, the shoe 
bomber), were invited to London and subsidized by the government to create circles of security 
for British Muslims while the genocide of Bosnian Muslims, coalition interdiction in the Middle 
East, and Israeli occupations in Palestine all occurred. At the same time, calls for Islamic identity 
and unity emerged in the immigrant enclaves as a way to rectify secular and religious life. These 
calls found an especially attentive audience in Islamic student organizations at universities. 
Many of these students studied abroad in Saudi Arabia, picked up the Salafist ideology, and 
brought back with them literalist interpretations of the Quran. The genocide of Bosnian Muslims 
impacted the Muslim immigrant community especially hard. Images of white Europeans 
slaughtering Muslims caused many to look cautiously at their white British counterparts and 
primed them for jihadist radicalization.98 Instead of attempting to get a grip on these minority 
communities by reinforcing a national identity like France did, it is evident the United Kingdom 
thought it best to let such communities cultivate and evolve without constraint. 
 Combine this radicalization with the economic disparity resulting from enclave culture 
and an “us vs them” or “insider vs outsider” mentality can form very easily with British 
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Muslims. Olivier Roy is especially keen on the “insider vs outsider” mentality in Muslim 
enclaves. The preachers who came and espoused radical ideas left their own families and homes 
to fight and preach abroad. They exist as prime examples of a Salafist ideology that views 
anyone who doesn’t rigidly adhere to its tenants as an outsider.99 Robert Leiken states, “The 
lords of Londonistan fastened their Outside narrative to the Inside alienation of numerous British 
Pakistanis. When the Eastern message of the Outside found Western alienation on the Inside, the 
mixture proves explosive. That blast detonated on a larger scale with the reception of ISIS in 
2014.”100 British jihadism is still currently the largest wave in all of European jihadism.101 
 
Germany 
 The last major enclave of the Muslim minority population in Europe in in Germany. Like 
the rest of Europe in the mid 20th Century, Germany brought in large numbers of immigrant 
laborers, many of them Turkish, to temporarily fill jobs while the country’s economy recovered 
from the devastation of the 2nd World War and communist occupation. As of 2012, there are 
between 3.8 and 4.3 million Muslims living in Germany. 66.7% of the Muslim population is 
Turkish and over 50% of Muslims are Sunni. The majority reside in the western half of the 
country and less than 33.3% have German citizenship.102 Many of the 1st generation Turkish 
immigrants were actually skilled laborers. However, upward mobility was once again hindered 
by social customs that resulted from the compartmentalization of the Turkish community. They 
tended to keep the company with families from their villages and only reproduce with such 
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individuals. Studies conducted by Federal Ministry of Family in Germany found that 90% of 
Turks married other Turks and less than 10% of those marriages were exogenous.103 As a result, 
Turkish post migrants experienced both internal and external isolation. They were clearly 
different than the German ethnocentric community and when they visited their native homeland, 
these post migrant children were viewed as “Germaners.” They belonged nowhere.104 
 As was the similar experience with both French and British Muslim immigrants, radical 
ideas began to capitalize on the economic and identity-based isolation faced by these post 
migrants. According to Leiken, the mid 2000s were a turning point in that the radicalization of 
the second generation of Turkish immigrants began to occur as a result of the influence of Al-
Qaeda related groups.105 Both the Islamic Information Center and the Multikultur Haus in the 
city of Ulm became renowned for the circulation of radical Islamic ideas. It was found that 
upwards of 20 attendees of these institutions went to train at Islamic Jihad Union camps, an Al-
Qaeda subset, in Pakistan. Leiken notes that when the Multikultur Haus was closed by authorities 
in late 2005, literature was found extolling the murder of Christians and Jews.106 In the summer 
of 2007, a group known as the Sauerland Group, which comprised of forty individuals, the 
majority of them ethnic Turks and some converts, were plotting attacks across Germany. The 
group was interdicted by German authorities before any attacks could be carried out. All of those 
implicated were determined to have been radicalized within Germany by the Islamic Jihad 
Union.107  
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 Robert Leiken asserts, “The post migrant Muslim extremist opts for an identity he 
chooses, not one he inherits. He adopts his own myth of return, to a golden age of Islamic 
intensity and purity… That narrative awaits him not only in the mosque or in the Islamic center 
but also in the university prayer room, the bookstore, the gym, and the cellblock.”108 In addition, 
there is the issue of jihadists coming back fighting in the Middle East, as was seen in the 
Manchester bomber. With over 4,000 Europeans having gone to fight in the Middle East, it has 
been estimated that upwards of 10-15% have already been killed in the fighting.109 Dr. Thomas 
Hegghammer looked at returning fighter data from the 1990s and the early 2000s and found that 
9% continue to commit attacks in their home countries. Dr. Neumann studied the phenomena of 
returning fighters and classified them as disillusioned, traumatized, undecided, and dangerous. It 
is these last two categories that he believes pose a potential threat to Europe. He states, “The 
number mobilized for the present conflict [Syria] is already four times what it was for Iraq… 
Even if we assume 30 per cent killed or permanently ‘emigrated’ and even if Hegghammer’s 
relatively low conversion rate of one in nine turns out to be true, we would still end up with 300 
‘dangerous’ returnees, who are motivated, and networked and have learnt their ‘profession’ from 
the most brutal terror group of all time”110 While this number is small by any population metric, 
the devastation from a view motivated individuals has already been seen since 9/11 and to have 
hundreds of such motivated and capable individuals existing in European society should cause 
concern. 
The aforementioned migrant crisis that has been occurring in Europe since 2011 has 
brought in more Muslim minority communities from Syria and across the Middle East. While 
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many attacks in recent years in Europe have occurred after much of the information presented 
was written, it is important to remember the experiences of these Muslim communities prior to 
this refugee crisis. The increased flow of Muslim migrants from the Middle East is only 
compounding on the problems experienced by these minority enclaves and further stressing the 
ability of these European states to combat the problem of radicalization in their countries.  
 
Organized Attacks in Europe 
 As stated in the introduction, this project classifies organized attacks as attacks that 
occurred on behalf of or involvement or training from an organization, namely the Islamic State 
and Al-Qaeda. The Global Terrorism Database was used to gather data on the organized attacks 
that occurred in Western Europe from 2001-2017 committed by Al-Qaeda and their affiliates and 
the Islamic State and their affiliates similar to the data presented in Chapter 1. 
 During this time frame, there have been 34 attacks in Western Europe (it is important to 
remember that each strike is considered its own attack). Prior to 2014, all attacks were 
committed by Al-Qaeda and after the Charlie Hebdo shooting in January 7, 2015, all subsequent 
attacks were committed by the Islamic State. Over 75% of all the attacks had some form of 
bombing or explosion during the incident. Armed assault took place in just over 21% of the 
attacks and the first attack involving armed assault did not occur until the Islamic State’s attack 
in Brussels on May 24, 2014. The only Al-Qaeda attack that used firearms was the 
aforementioned Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in 2015. Transportation was the largest target until 
after the July 7, 2005 bombings in London. After that point, businesses and private citizens 
become the largest targets of subsequent attacks. Only 29 of the 34 attacks actually had 
casualties resulting from them, but when attacks were successful, 8 of the 29 attacks had 
	 47	
casualties ranging from 11-50 and 12 attack had casualties in ranges larger than 101. This data is 
available in Figure 10. Note that not all graphs add up to exactly 34 attacks due to the 
overlapping nature (i.e. hostage taking and armed assault in one attack) of tactics.111 
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Figure 10 
Type of Attacks Over Time  
 
 








In addition, there are a number of characteristics of organized attacks that the Global 
Terrorism Database cannot provide. In terms of suicide attacks (attacks where the perpetrator’s 
death must occur for the attack to be successful) and non-suicide attacks (includes attacks where 
the perpetrator wanted to live or expected to be gunned down), non suicide attacks outnumber 
suicide attacks. Suicide attack frequency remained largely the same from 2010-2017 with zero 
occurring from 2011-2014 and 2 per year occurring between 2015-2017.112  but the mass 
casualties from attacks like the Manchester bombing may make it seem like suicide attacks are 
more prevalent than they actually are. Despite non-suicide attacks occurring more than suicide 
attacks, it was found that in the majority of cases involving non-suicide attacks, the perpetrator 
still intended on dying as some point or was not phased with the prospect of dying. Either way, 
getting away was either not the end goal or just extra luck.113 
In addition, it is important to note that suicide attacks are consistent with organized 
attacks and rarely, if never found among lone wolf attacks. The reason behind this is largely due 
to organizational planning. Suicide attacks involving bombs require a certain level of training 
and organizational logistics to be carried out effectively. Ariel Merari studied the phenomena of 
suicide bombing in Palestine in his book Driven to Death and his findings over the demographics 
of suicide bombers support this notion. He had found that over 95% of suicide bombers were 
males and 89% were under the age of 30. 66.7% of all suicide bombers expressed distress at 
actually carrying out the attack and this distress and desire to abandon the mission became more 
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intense as the days and hours drew closer to the moment of truth.114 Therefore, it is clear that a 
supporting organization must be present for a suicide attack to be carried out. As Dr. Jeffery 
Lewis notes, “They [suicide attacks] are seldom the product of an individualized choice. They 
are almost always the product of an organizational process designed to transform otherwise 
normal individuals into agents of self-destruction.”115 The technical expertise, training, and 
pressure to actually commit the attack are simply nonexistent with an organization. 
 Overall, 444 people have been killed and over 1,900 people have been injured as a result 
of organized terror attacks committed by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Despite being pushed 
back or routed from land holdings, both organizations still present a real, but statistically small 
threat to Western Europe 
 
Homegrown Terrorists 
 Homegrown terror attacks are an amorphous classification. By the standards of this 
project, the attacks presented in the Global Terrorism Database are considered organized attacks. 
However, that does not mean that any attacks not mentioned falls under the category of 
homegrown terrorism. These such attacks must be committed by lone individuals or groups of 
fewer than three people and have no prior affiliation to an organized group outside of a pledge of 
allegiance. No such database records these attacks and attacks that were prevented by European 
state forces are not always broadcasted for security reasons. That being said, the threat of 
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homegrown attacks will be evaluated more on their potential lethality and rate of occurrence 
with a few case studies as boundaries.  
 On November 2, 2004, Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was ambushed on the street by 
Muhammad Bouyeri, a man of Dutch and Moroccan descent, who stabbed and shot Van Gogh. 
Bouyeri was not a member of affiliated with any organization but rather inspired to kill Van 
Gogh out of revenge for his film Submission, a controversial documentary about marital abuse in 
Islamic marriages which garnered heavy condemnation and death threats from Muslims. Only 
one actually followed through.116  On July 8, 2016, 31-year-old Tunisian Mohamad Lahouaiej-
Bouhlel drove a 19-ton truck through the streets of Nice, France into a crowd celebrating Bastille 
Day and killed 86 people and wounded another 458. Although multiple people were later 
arrested in conjunction with the attack and the Islamic State claimed responsibility for it, French 
authorities assessed that Bouhlel was inspired by their propaganda and had no affiliation.117 
These attacks, one an assassination and one a mass casualty event, represent the capabilities of 
homegrown terrorists. They can be stealthy and surgical or destructive and rampaging.  
 It is important to quickly examine a general profile of lone wolves before detailing their 
threat. According to the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, homegrown terrorists 
exhibit three main patterns. The first is that social ineptitude or psychological disturbance is 
common trait among perpetrators. The second is voluntary isolation from society. This can easily 
be demonstrated in the rejection of familial customs seen 2nd generation Muslim immigrants. The 
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third and final pattern is the distribution of ideas or manifestos before or after the attack such as 
Bouyeri leaving a note on Van Gogh’s body after killing him.118 
 Homegrown terrorist capabilities, however, are not nearly as consistent as organizational 
capabilities for carrying out attacks. The aforementioned fact that a plurality of organized attack 
casualties exceeded 101 demonstrates a certain level of success that homegrown attacks have not 
been able to consistently replicate. However, there are a number of characteristics to the tactic of 
homegrown terrorism that make it a threat. The first main advantage harkens back to al-Suri’s 
Call to Global Islamic Resistance. If the operative on the outer level of the jihad movement that 
is inspired to commits attacks is compromised, it rarely affects the inner leadership or 
propaganda distributers. In addition, the level of independence and autonomy given to the 
individual in the outer level makes it difficult to prepare counter-tactics since homegrown 
terrorists do not follow the tactical tendencies of organizations. Thomas Hegghammer discovered 
that the “downside” of fighting for an organization is the level of control it holds over the 
individual jihadist. Deviation from the organization’s ideology or tactics are rarely tolerated even 
when it may mean greater operational success.119 Without these constraints, homegrown 
terrorists are free to choose the methods, time, and place of attack to their liking.  
 Another characteristic of homegrown terrorism in Europe that makes it a threat is the 
larger pool of potential recruits. The European Muslim population is 14 times larger than that of 
the United States. In addition, Europe has also experienced 8.3 times more Islamic terror attacks 
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than the United States.120 Now, this project is not making any claims that a larger Muslim 
population equals more terror attacks. However, the propaganda put forth by Al-Qaeda and more 
recently the Islamic State has a strong emphasis on identity-choice appeals, something which has 
been demonstrated to be lacking in Muslim immigrant communities in Europe. Therefore, on a 
statistical basis, the likelihood of someone being radicalized from the European Muslim 
population is larger than that of the United States due to the greater population size and x-factor 
of Muslims identity isolation in enclaves.  
 Another homegrown terrorist characteristic that represents a threat is the type of weapons 
used in attacks. Even through aforementioned instruction manuals appear in the propaganda of 
organizations, inspired readers rarely have the technical expertise to construct a bomb. Since 
homegrown terrorists do not have the capability or support to construct effective explosives, they 
have turned to simpler weapons such as firearms, knives, and vehicles. The devastation of 
vehicles being used as a weapon is evident in the attack on Nice, France, which has only been 
rivaled in casualty numbers by the most destructive bomb blast by the Al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State. As of 2017, 150 people have died and over 800 people have been injured in vehicular 
attacks.121 However, vehicular effectiveness is largely limited by the targets itself since vehicles 
cannot truly penetrate large structures and are really only effectively used in large crowds.  
Firearm effectiveness is fairly self-evident and is not limited by the constraints physical 
structures. The Paris attacks in November 2015 (although organized) in which over 130 people 
died demonstrate this. Even strict European firearm laws are able to be circumvented by 
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dedicated homegrown terrorists. A European Commission report in April, 2018 found that 
military-grade rifles were able to be smuggled into Europe and sold through the internet or 
European criminal gangs to terrorist groups.122 The editor of the report, Niles Duquet, stated, “In 
Western Europe, the traditional closed character of criminal gun markets has partially eroded in 
recent years and we have observed an increased availability of military-grade firearms. These 
weapons have also ended up in the hand of terrorists.”123 Although not as consistently 
devastating as bomb detonations, these tactics should not be ignored as non-threatening.  
 
Preliminary Conclusions 
 The threat of Salafist jihadi terrorism to Europe is still alive and well. The alienation 
experienced by 2nd and 3rd generation Muslims whose families immigrated to Europe has created 
a large pool of disillusioned and angry young people who are vulnerable for radicalization. There 
have been a number of organized attacks in Europe since 2001 with Al-Qaeda dominating the 
scene prior to 2014 and the Islamic State taking the mantle after 2014, if only for a short while. 
Organized attacks have a number of capabilities including large organizational logistics, the 
ability to make effective explosives, and the willingness to use suicide bombers in their attacks. 
However, organization attacks can be predicated on the patterns and beliefs of a particular 
organization. This reduces their threat to an extent since law enforcement and governments can 
develop policies to counter tactical patterns. Homegrown attacks are harder to properly assess 
due to their amorphous nature, but their autonomy for tactical planning and large pool of 
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potential recruits plays to their advantage as a threat that is incredibly hard to preemptively fight. 
However, homegrown terrorist weapons are largely limited to simpler mechanisms such as 
firearms, knives, and vehicles, which lack the destructive capability of a well-put-together 























 If one were to run a quantitative analysis for a number of metrics (i.e. body count, 
financial loss, media air-time) resulting from terrorist attacks perpetrated by Salafist 
organizations accounted by the Global Terrorism Database, one would find the United States 
exceeds that of all of Europe. However, the United States only had five incidents compared to 
Europe’s 34 incidents occurring between 2001 and 2017. The reason for this is simple; the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. According to the GTD, four separate attacks occurred on this 
date: the attack on tower one, the attack on tower two, the attack on the Pentagon, and the 
crashed plane in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Over 3,000 people were killed during this incident 
alone and has remained ingrained in the national memory as one of the most devastating attacks 
against the United States ever since.124 The 9/11 attacks make up the near entirety of the United 
States’ statistics involving attacks from organized Salafist groups. Only one officially organized 
attack has occurred in the United States since 9/11 and that was the “underwear bomber” attack 
on December 25, 2009 when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s bomb failed to detonate on a flight 
to Detroit, injuring only himself and a fellow passenger.125 However, since 9/11 360 people have 
been charged with jihadi terror crimes in the United States, with some actually carrying out 
attacks like the aforementioned attack at The Ohio State University. Why is this the case? Why is 
it that amid all the targeting against the United States in organized propaganda and criticisms of 
U.S. interventions in the Middle East have there been so few organized attacks and so many 
homegrown terrorist attacks? 
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The U.S. Difference 
Immigrants and Refugees  
The United States is known colloquially as a “melting pot.” Immigration to the U.S. has 
existed throughout the nation’s entire history (primarily from European countries, but more 
recently from Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries). The majority of refugees are 
coming from either Africa and the Middle East. In fact, the United States has more immigrants 
than any other country on Earth and 13.5% of the population is foreign born.126 As a result, U.S. 
culture has evolved to have some degree of natural tolerance to outsiders that is only now just 
forming in the single-ethnically dominated states of Europe. 65% of Americans polled by Pew 
Research in 2017 believed that immigrants and refugees strengthened the country by adding 
skills and talents to the labor pool.  
This attitude and appreciation is also reciprocal. Over half of all immigrants and refugees 
are proficient in English, demonstrating a certain level of willingness to assimilate into the 
United States. In addition, according to sociology professor Dr. Edward Crenshaw, the United 
States implements resettlement provisions for refugees so that they are dispersed throughout the 
interior of the country and not just consolidated on coastal cities.127 This helps prevent the issue 
of large immigrant or refugee populations forming cultural enclaves like that which has been 
shown in France and the United Kingdom. As Peter Bergen states, “For French Muslims, in 
short, there is no ‘French Dream,’ nor, by extension, an ‘EU Dream’… It’s also not surprising 
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that it is the European country that had suffered to most severe ‘blowback’ from the Syrian 
war.”128 In addition, due to geographic separation and bias for family-sponsored immigrants, 
massive waves of immigrants from the Middle East and Africa do not affect the United States 
like Europe.129 This both naturally and artificially filters people who want to travel and 
assimilate versus those who are fleeing violence and “end up” somewhere without a true desire 
to assimilate. As a result, this promotes assimilation into U.S. culture and society to the point that 
those of foreign descent see themselves as part of the culture and society instead of outside it, or 
worse, against it. 
 
Counter-Terrorism 
 The attacks on September 11, 2001 were not only the most devastating terror attack in the 
Western world, but also a tremendous piece of theater. The ability of a non-state actor such as 
Al-Qaeda to be able to attack the financial and defense capitals of the world’s foremost 
superpower by turning passenger airlines into de-facto cruise missiles from a purely operational 
and tactical standpoint is an impressive feat. However, it is a statistical outlier.130 The likelihood 
that an attack of that magnitude could be perpetrated by a non-state actor against the new 
security measures placed by the United States and other Western countries is near zero.131 
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The United States’ response to the 9/11 attacks ultimately contributes to the lack of 
organized and high casualty attacks. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security under 
President George W. Bush in 2002 combined over 22 federal agencies and departments under 
one umbrella to safeguard critical U.S. infrastructure and gather intelligence in conjunction with 
other federal departments. The Patriot Act of 2001 was a controversial bipartisan piece of 
legislation that aimed at increasing the cooperation of various intelligence agencies and gave law 
enforcement greater autonomy in tracking suspected terrorists. In addition, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 - considered one of the most substantive pieces of 
national security legislations since the National Security Act of 1947 – created a Director of 
Intelligence position that was in charge of the entire U.S. intelligence community, including 
military intelligence units.132 Lastly, the U.S. military’s quick response and presence in 
Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks deposed of the Taliban government and destroyed the 
safe-haven camps Al-Qaeda had been using with impunity. 
Such drastic changes in national security not only stirred up controversy over the 
disregard for civil liberties of U.S. citizens, but also created a large wave of discontent under 
President Bush that the U.S. was waging a war against Islam instead of terrorists.133 However, 
like President Bush, much of President Obama’s national security policy was still focused a 
forward military presence, but in a different manner. Obama pulled back conventional force 
intervention and instead opted for “seeking out” and “disrupting” terrorists before they could 
attack. He increased the use of Joint Special Operations Command to take down key terrorist 
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suspects abroad, such as Osama Bin Laden in 2011. With its own air force, drones, and 
intelligence operatives, Peter Bergen comments, “It [JSOC] was in some ways less accountable 
than the CIA.”134 Conservative estimates that by the end of Obama’s second term as president, 
3,000 people had been killed in drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, countries in which the U.S. 
did not officially have a military presence in.135 Nevertheless, the efforts of the United States 
intelligence community, military, and rest of the federal government were doing something right 
in the fight against organized terrorist attacks on the homeland.  
While many other Western nations have increased their counter-terror capabilities by 
bolstering intelligence units and assisting the U.S. military abroad, the magnitude by which this 
effort has been undertaken in the United States must be made known as a contributing factor to 
the lack of organized attacks in the United States.  
 
U.S. Muslims: Profile and Opinions 
One of the last major differences between the United States and Europe that contributes 
to the smaller number of terror attacks is the profile of Muslims that are immigrating, 
assimilating, and living within the United States. As has been stated earlier, American Muslims 
are not as vulnerable to radicalization as their European counterparts due to many factors, a 
major one being their ability and willingness to assimilate and avoid establishing enclaves. U.S. 
Muslims tend to be wealthier than their European counterparts simply on the basis of the cost of 
living and cost of immigrating. Crossing the Mediterranean Sea is undoubtedly less expensive 
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than trying to cross the Atlantic Ocean. According to Pew Research, U.S. Muslims have a 
college or post-graduate degree at the same rate as non-Muslim U.S. adults (31%). In addition, 
U.S. Muslims are near as likely to report household incomes over $100,000 at the same rate as 
other demographics of U.S. adults. Peter Bergen also states, “The American Dream has worked 
pretty well for the majority of American Muslims, who are both as wealthy an educated as the 
average American.”136 Despite U.S. Muslims having a smaller likelihood of owning a house or 
being employed full-time relative to other adult demographics, Pew Research notes that U.S. 
Muslims report overall satisfaction with their finances as other adult demographics.137 
Despite these positive aspects that assist in assimilation, Muslims in the United States can 
still hold opinions sympathetic to Islamic terrorism or anti-U.S. foreign policy. It should be noted 
that the following information is not inherently good or bad, but a reflection of attitudes 
discovered by Pew Research from phone interviews in 2007 and 2011 and internet polls in2016. 
Initially, there was a large amount of resentment towards the Bush administration following the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq and the so-called War on Terror. This dropped slightly with the election of 
Barack Obama, who promised the ending of such interventions abroad (when in reality he just 
changed tactics as previously mentioned). In 2011, close to half of all Muslims surveyed across 
country-of-origin groups saw the War on Terror as insincere. In January 2016, 47% of Muslims 
surveyed felt the War on Terror was a war against Islam, but this declined to just 32% by 
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October of that same year. Shi’a U.S. Muslims also expressed similar disapproval, even though 
most of the fighting was against Sunni Muslims.138 
In terms of opinions of terrorist tactics and groups, U.S. Muslims have a far lower 
approval rate of such topics relative to their disapproval of U.S. foreign policy. Across various 
origin groups, Pew found a 1-12% approval rate of Al-Qaeda by U.S. Muslims in 2007, which 
dropped to a 0-6% approval rate by 2011. Approval of suicide bombing was between 2-10% 
across origin groups in 2007 and marginally declined to 2-9% in 2011.139 One of the most 
prominent conclusions from this data is that overall approval of Al-Qaeda and suicide bombing 
remained low and consistent (with both rates declining) across the time measured.  
All of these characteristics that make up the difference between U.S. Muslims and their 
European counterparts help explain why the United States has suffered so few and effective 
organized terror attacks since 9/11/2001. All of the major components that are characteristic for 
organizational recruitment in Europe such as group isolation, enclaves, and governments 
permitting the establishment of radical imams in mosques simply do not exist on the same level 
in the United States. The immigrant assimilation history and culture of the United States, the 
counter-terrorism efforts of the U.S. government in the post 9/11 era, and the low approval rate 
of Al-Qaeda and hallmark jihadist tactics like suicide bombing explain why the level of 
organized terror in the United States is so low relative to Europe.  
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Attacks in the United States: Data, Trends, and Challenges 
Data 
 Since organized attacks in the United States are so low – only one having occurred in the 
post-9/11 era with no deaths – resulting from the aforementioned “U.S. Difference,” it necessary 
to get an overall summary of the attacks (both failed and successful) that have occurred on U.S. 
soil. Just because the GTD only reported one attack after 9/11 up through 2017 does not mean 
there were no attacks, deaths, or casualties resulting from Salafist jihadism in the United States. 
According to Peter Bergen, from 9/11 to 2016, there have been 360 people that have been 
charged with jihadist terror crimes in the United States.140 These include everything from murder 
to small money transfers. Tacit support of terrorism in the form of small money transfers is one 
such way wealthier Muslims who live in United States can be involved. The overwhelming 
majority of those charged were American citizens and about half were charged with attempting 
to join a terrorist organization overseas. This is an important distinction to note. Due to the 
aforementioned factors that neuter organized terror’s effectiveness, any U.S. Muslim that wanted 
to be affiliated with an organization had to travel abroad to do so.141 
According to Peter Bergen, 94 Americans have been killed by jihadists in the United 
States since the 9/11 attacks.142 All of these deaths resulted from attacks not recorded in the GTD 
data simply because the only other organized attack that occurred on U.S. soil had two casualties, 
but no deaths.143 Compare this to the 444 Europeans that have been killed just from attacks 
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recorded in the GTD and one can appreciate the difference in the overall threat that Salafist 
terrorism poses to the United States as well as the threat (or lack thereof) from organized Salafist 
groups, 9/11 being withheld. In addition, it is important to keep the potential effectiveness of 
organized terrorism in context given both the regional and operational challenges groups such as 
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State face. According to Brian Jenkins, the operational capabilities of 
both organizations 15 years after 9/11 are quite limited. These groups often only succeed due to 
local governmental collapse and not their military prowess, which forces them to focus on 
regional quarrels.144 Simple geography can obviously place Europe in the regional extension of 
such group’s operational capabilities. However, planning and carrying out an attack an ocean 
away presents such large logistical challenges to these organizations that the potential payoff is 
oftentimes not worth the effort. Despite this, Al-Qaeda is still vocal about their commitment to 
attack the United States.145 
 According to Brian Jenkins, there have been 32 homegrown “plots” to commit terrorism 
in the United States from 2002-2010. Of these 32, only ten got to an actual operational planning 
stage and of those ten, six were F.B.I stings. Of those four that were not stings, only three were 
ever actually carried out. Three of the 32 plots involved 6 or more people and 22 involved just 
one individual. Only six of the plots had any sort of communication with an organization.146 20 
attacks have been at least inspired by the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda in the 2010 decade so far, 
including the 2014 San Bernardino shooting and the 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting.147 This 
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data helps put the overall threat – organized and homegrown – into perspective in that there 
might be a high number of plots but there is a sizable reduction in the amount that are actually 
carried out successfully. 
 
Trends 
 While reassuring, these facts do not make the United States immune to the threat of 
Salafist terrorism, organized or unorganized.  One thing that must be made clear is that the nature 
of Salafist terrorism. One of the hallmark characteristics of terrorism in the pre-9/11 era was that 
major attacks would often be followed by smaller secondary strikes. These were determined to 
be “clusters” of attacks.148 Terrorism in the post-9/11 era, especially that which is committed by 
Salafists, on average, are not as successful and are random. Smaller Salafist attacks are not 
predicated by a large successful strike somewhere around the globe and also have no particular 
pattern or increased likelihood relative to specific calendar dates.149 The fact that “clusters” of 
attacks are not characteristic of modern Salafist terrorism may seem to be a good thing. 
However, in reality, the randomness of the attacks provides law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies no additional benefit in trying to prevent attacks from happening.  
 Another difference between pre-9/11 terrorism and modern Salafist terrorism is their 
frequency and lethality. A notable decline in the number successful attacks has been occurred 
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with post-9/11 terrorism have far fewer attacks relative to the pre-9/11 era. Figure 11 showcases 
the decline of successful attacks.150 
However, Brian Jenkins states, 
“The decline in the volume of 
terrorist attacks has been offset by 
the greater determination of today’s 
terrorists, especially those inspired 
by jihadist ideology, to kill in 
quantity, which brings us to the next 
observation. There are fewer 
incidents overall, but lethality has 
increased.”151 While this data is not limited to just the United States, the overall trends are still 
applicable to the threat the U.S. faces.  
 
Challenges 
 Finally, one of the major challenges that the United States continues to face in dealing 
with these threats is which level of law enforcement is responsible for countering these attacks. 
The federal intelligence agencies obviously are responsible for preventing outside threats from 
entering the country, but there has emerged confusion over who is supposed to watch and 
prevent homegrown terrorism. Local law enforcement often complains that operationally 
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relevant intelligence is kept from them by federal agencies when the potential threat is in their 
jurisdiction. Brian Jenkins assets, “Local authorities continue to complain that operational threat 
information does not get to them and what they do see is so broad it’s ‘unactionable.’”152 
Although federal agencies like the F.B.I. have been successful in a number of sting operations 
for preventing homegrown terrorism, the lack of information sharing and inter-authority 
cooperation leaves local law enforcement handicapped at preventing homegrown threats in their 
jurisdiction.  
 
The Homegrown Terrorist: Profile and Radicalization  
  
Common Profile and Trends 
Given the data for attacks in the United States, it is clear that homegrown terrorists make 
up a significant majority of the attacks since 9/11/2001. However, the differences between U.S. 
and European Muslims (both native born and immigrants) begs the question as to why some are 
still committing or attempting to commit attacks in the United States. Looking back at the Pew 
Research of U.S. Muslim opinions, it is clear that approval for tactics characteristic of 
organizations and actual affiliation with an organization are quite low and have been on the 
decline. However, the polls still showcase a large minority with negative view of U.S. foreign 
policy. Recall that Abdul Artan, The Ohio State University attacker, expressed overall anger and 
disapproval over U.S. influence abroad and how it is affecting Muslims around the world. 
Indeed, Associate Professor at the Naval War College Christopher Jasparro found that asserts 
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that the primary jihadist motivation for attacking the United States is anger at U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East and towards Muslims.153 This is not to say that those who disapprove of U.S. 
foreign policy in the Muslim world are more prone to terrorism, but simply that political 
disapproval is found in the motivations of homegrown terrorists.  
Recall the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism’s three main patterns for 
homegrown terrorism: common psychological disturbances, high social ineptitude or desire for 
societal isolation, and the distribution of ideas or manifestos before attacks.154 The Centre also 
found political or religious ideologies were combined with personal grievances to create a strong 
enough motivation to attack. In addition, while some attack locations are random, those that are 
chosen ahead of time are chosen for specific reasons. However, they rarely represent the actual 
heart of the grievance the attacker is experiencing.155 Carlos Bledsoe’s attack is one such 
example where his overall anger at the U.S. military led him to attack the least defended, yet 
symbolic target of American military might; an undefended armed forces recruiting center in 
Little Rock, Arkansas.156 
Another trend in the homegrown profile is their tactics. According to Brian Jenkins’s 
analysis of all jihadist plots between 2002-2010, “Bombs were the weapon of choice in most of 
the plots, although none of the plotters successfully built an explosive device.”157 As previously 
stated, bombs require too much planning and technical expertise to the point that it is simply not 
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feasible for someone to attempt, even with the instructions disseminated on the internet. 
Homegrown terrorists instead opt for cruder weapons such as firearms, cars, and knives.158 Al-
Baghdadi himself is quoted in saying, “If you are not able to find an IED or a bullet, then single 
out the disbelieving American, Frenchman, or any of their allies. Smash his head with a rock, or 
slaughter him with a knife, or run over him with your car, or throw him down from a high place 
or choke him, or poison him.”159 In addition, both suicide (dying as a means to an end) and 
suicidal (dying as an end in itself) are both found to have been low priorities among homegrown 
terrorists. Eight out the ten plots between 2002 and 2010 that got to the operational stage 
involved the perpetrator getting away alive to commit more attacks,160 further proving that 
homegrown terrorists lack the institutional pressure to commit suicide attacks.  
In terms of their demographics, the 360 individuals charged with jihadist terrorism in the 
United States since 9/11 are overwhelmingly male. Their average age is 29. One-third were 
married with children and 12% had served prison time.161 Peter Bergen also found that the 
majority were introduced to their Salafist beliefs after a personal crisis such as a job loss, racist 
encounter, or death of a relative.162 Another profile that Bergen also discovered was that most of 
the jihadists were middle class or wealthier. This makes sense since most of the Muslims in the 
United States have the same economic demographics as other U.S. adults, but what is interesting 
is his explanation why. While European Muslim immigrants might feel resentment toward their 
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inability to economically advance, American Muslims who are poor are too busy making ends 
meet to be drawn to terrorism. Middle class Muslims, he claims, are more vulnerable because 
they tend to have more disposable time and money.163 
The last major trend in conjunction with the aforementioned targeting preferences is the 
time of attacks. Research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School found that the majority of 
homegrown terrorist attacks occurred during a weekday.164 This would make sense for a number 
of reasons. The first reason being that the target of a homegrown terrorist (if it is one or multiple 
people) are more likely to be in expected places such as their place of work. This makes the task 
of target acquisition significantly easier for the perpetrator. The second reason is due to the mass 
casualty emphasis that homegrown terrorism has come to embrace since 9/11. Not only is the 
likelihood of hitting a specific target greater during a weekday, but the odds of collateral damage 
are increased simply because there is more activity during the week. The last major reason why 
the time of attacks matter is for media attention. Given that most media sources will be at work 
during the week, an attack during work hours and with mass casualties would gain greater and 
faster press coverage. Overall, the time of attack, along with all other contributing trends, that is 
common in homegrown terrorist attacks that must be noted in order to develop effective policy at 
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Radicalization  
Through years of study, the F.B.I. has created a model to quantify the radicalization 
process. Their model of radicalization consists of four main steps: pre-radicalization, 
identification, indoctrination, and action. Pre-radicalization is simply the time period before a 
vulnerable individual is contacted by or discovers radicalizing propaganda. They may have the 
aforementioned identity and emotional qualms but have not been exposed to any potentially 
dangerous information. Identification is an emotionally driven stage when a potential recruit is 
exposed to and begins to empathize with the information being presented either by a contact or 
discovered by themselves. Indoctrination occurs when a potential recruit begins to rationalize 
this new information into beliefs. They begin to justify it on legalistic or moralistic grounds and, 
in terms of Salafism, begin to have a low tolerance for deviancy from the in-group. Action is the 
final stage and is the point where the recruit has been fully indoctrinated to make the jump to 
justify violence and begins planning an operation.165 
Understanding the radicalization of homegrown terrorist is key in order to fully grasp the 
threat that homegrown terrorists in the United States present. As previously mentioned, the 
demographic of homegrown terrorists in the United States tend to be young men. Even with their 
on average wealthier status, living in a country with an aggressive anti-terrorism foreign policy 
such as the United States and having such a disagreement with such policies can cause a level of 
cognitive dissonance and identity crisis that their counterparts in Europe face. The U.S. Institute 
of Peace asserts that radicalization is “a complex and highly individualized process, often shaped 
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by a poorly understood interaction of structural and personal factors.”166 This cognitive 
dissonance and identity crisis in homegrown terrorists is largely built upon one visceral emotion: 
shame.  
Recall the breakdown of Suri’s Call to Global Islamic Resistance. The outer-most ring of 
the resistance composes of individuals or small cells inspired, but not directed by the inner two. 
Organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have begun to follow this model as their 
regional campaigns have been pushed back. These organizations have increasingly devoted more 
time in their radicalization process and have used the concept of shame as a powerful motivator. 
The infamous American Sheikh turned Al-Qaeda pundit Anwar Al-Awlaki is quoted in saying, 
“How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is 
responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters.”167 
Capitalizing off the shame that Muslims may feel about living in the United States and reaping 
the benefits of a society whose government is intervening in the Middle East can certainly lead 
those vulnerable to such a message to be pressured into joining the global jihad against the West.  
Through the use of shame and personal identity, radicalizing agents are able to develop a 
sort of “cognitive radicalization” in the minds of recruits where the recruits voluntarily come to 
the conclusions by themselves that the radicalizing agents want them to make. This process 
makes the recruits acquire values, attitudes, political beliefs that deviate from mainstream society 
in the West. In the minds of recruits, this process can manifest itself in a Salafist outlook, which, 
taken to its logical extension, justifies inter-group violence.168 This is further bolstered by the 
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social pressure to create a unique identity in modern society as a projection of themselves.169 For 
those who feel shame for living in the West, Salafism provides an easy solution. 
Within the context of Salafism, shame is also used as a differentiator between the in-
group and the out-group. Testimony from friends and colleagues of homegrown terrorists cite 
that the individual would engage in oddly traditional behaviors out-of-the-blue. Carlos Bledsoe, 
the recruiting center attacker, avoided his parents entirely after one argument about his increased 
fundamentalism, started wearing traditional Middle Eastern robes, got rid of his dog because 
some Muslims consider dogs unclean, and legally changed his name to Abdulhakim Mujahid 
Muhammad.170 Major Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, became increasingly distant from 
both his family and congregation in the years leading up to his attack due to his fundamentalist 
views on the Quran, he rebuked several date set-ups from friends because the women being 
introduced were not traditional enough, and he gave presentations at Walter Reed defending 
Osama Bin Laden and suicide bombing.171 All of these behaviors resulted from the fact that these 
individuals could not reconcile their beliefs with the society they were living in, which solidified 
their in-group vs out-group mentality.   
Since 9/11, and increasing amount of the radicalization process has been conducted on 
the internet. According to Middle Eastern security official Colonel Faiz Al-Shihri, Al-Qaeda 
devotes upwards of 99% of its radicalization and recruitment effort towards internet 
                                                
169 Dawson, Lorne. “Sketch of a Social Ecology Model for Explaining Homegrown Terrorist 
Radicalisation.” Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, 2017. 
https://doi.org/10.19165/2017.1.01. 7 
170	Bergen, United States of Jihad: Who Are America’s Homegrown Terrorists, and How Do We 
Stop Them? 61 
171	Bergen, United States of Jihad: Who Are America’s Homegrown Terrorists, and How Do We 
Stop Them? 72-73 
	 74	
radicalization.172 Brian Jenkins states, “Many homegrown terrorists begin their violent journey 
on the internet. It is accessible to seekers, reinforcing and challenging their anger, it creates 
online communities of like minded extremists, it facilitates clandestine communication.”173 The 
internet provides an excellent medium for such a process. The anonymity combined with instant 
communication allows the dissemination of such ideas to anyone with access without immediate 
potential repercussions like the risk of getting caught in an in-person meeting.  
Furthermore, the use of internet allows radicalizing agents to customize their narrative to 
exactly what they want potential recruits to feel and know. Former commander of the Chicago 
Police Department Michael Mealer asserts, “Extremist groups recruit top-down through 
inspirational and informational web pages, blogs, and discussion groups, which provides the 
vulnerable individual with a ‘personal role, clear worldview, and a righteous purpose.’”174 Refer 
back to the format of Dabiq and Inspire magazines. They are well put together and organized in 
such a way to present a variety of topics that a potential recruit might have reservations or 
questions about. Single issues like foreign policy are rarely strong enough alone to inspire 
radicalization to the point of violence. The fact that over one-third of Muslims across origin 
groups think the War on Terror is a war on Islam yet have such a low approval of Al-Qaeda and 
their tactics proves this. Therefore, radicalization requires a holistic emphasis. It must manipulate 
emotions, use shame and identity, and cite multiple issues as a cause for violence. The internet 
allows these themes to be wrapped up into a single medium that can be specifically designed to 
fit the desired narrative for each recruit.  
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Despite the apparent advantages that the internet may provide for the process of 
radicalization, it can be incredibly shallow. Anonymity, one of the internet’s greatest strengths 
for this process, can be a major drawback. Author Zeynep Tufecki states, “The fact that this 
person will no longer be in your life in just a few minutes or hours can fee you to discuss issues 
that might otherwise be embarrassing or have deleterious social consequences.”175 Essentially, 
anonymity can create disingenuous association. Someone who feels shame and an identity crisis 
that wants to be apart of something greater than themselves without much effort can find such a 
release in online jihadist forums because association does not inevitably mean action. Brian 
Jenkins asserts, “Reaching does not mean radicalizing, and radicalizing does not mean 
recruitment to violent jihad. The internet has facilitated access to many more recruits than al-
Qaeda could reach personally, but it is low-yield mining.”176 Like the number of plots that 
actually got to an operational stage, a level of filtering occurs in the radicalization process simply 
because the institutional pressures are not there to fully supervise the process. While a narrative 
can be meticulously constructed to win over a potential recruit, at the end of the day an 
anonymous cursor on a web page does not have the same weight for radicalizing as an in-person 
interaction with a radicalized imam or a close community such as the enclaves of Europe.  
 
Preliminary Conclusions 
 The threat to the United States from Salafist terrorism is low relative to Europe. A 
number of factors contribute to this such as geography, immigrant culture, wealth status, 
assimilation efforts, and counter-terrorism efforts. The 9/11 attacks exist largely as a statistical 
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outlier for assessing the threat of organized terrorism to the United States. The institutional 
structures that must exist for a terrorist organization to pose a substantial threat simply do not 
exist in the United States. However, the threat of homegrown terrorism remains. A significant 
number of plots have been attempted since 9/11 with a few succeeding. The rapid advance of 
internet technology allows the dissemination of radicalizing propaganda to reach a wider 
audience than ever before. This, when combined with societal and identity troubles that 
vulnerable individuals might be facing, can be a very effective means in which to recruit a wider 
audience to Salafism and jihad. However, the success of radicalization is predicated for on the 
vulnerable individual than the radicalizing agent since the institutional pressure of radicalization 
for not nearly as intimate on the internet. Like the homegrown terrorists of Europe, homegrown 
terrorists in the United States do not often have successful attacks and when they do, they are not 
as devastating as organizationally planned attacks. However, even though successful attacks may 
not yield relatively high casualties, the difficulty of preventing them due to their individualized 














As the Middle East and parts of North Africa begin to stabilize after years of civil war 
following the Arab Spring, the presence of Western military forces declines, and the capabilities 
of organizations like the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda are fractions of what they once were, it is 
important to remember that the threat of Salafist Islamic terrorism is something that should not 
be ignored. Thousands of people in the United States and Western Europe have been killed or 
wounded from this phenomenon since the turn of the millennia and, despite their decline, 
organizations like the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda are vocal in their continued efforts to attack 
the West.177 In many ways, Salafist terrorism changed the way in which terrorism is conducted 
around the world in both an organized and homegrown fashion. While occurring less, terrorism 
has overall become more lethal and taken on a mass casualty emphasis.178  
Let’s quickly reexamine some key features of both types of attacks with this mass 
casualty emphasis. Organized attacks were, as this project viewed, attacks orchestrated, funded, 
trained, or otherwise overseen by a recognized terrorist organization or one of their affiliates. 
This project viewed any attack committed by the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, or any of their 
affiliates as subject to this categorization. Organized attacks typically use more advanced tactics 
like bombs or suicide operations, which require a certain level of intelligence, logistical 
capabilities, and social pressure only found in established groups. Organized attacks tend to be 
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committed by individuals recruited from places that have liaisons or advocates such as radical 
mosques or enclaves in Europe. Lastly, organized attacks are typically deadlier than homegrown 
attacks, but easier to intercept due to the level of planning and logistics often required for an 
attack to be successful.  
Homegrown terrorist attacks, as viewed by this project, were largely any other Salafist 
attack committed by a lone individual or small group of people. The only real qualifier is that the 
role of an established organization must be limited to inspiration or social pressure from 
propaganda or contacts with no other role in the attack. Homegrown attacks, while showing a 
preference for bombs, tend to use lower skilled weapons such as firearms or cars to commit the 
attack.179 Homegrown terrorists rarely opt for suicide operations and instead would rather live to 
continue further attacks.180 Homegrown attacks tend to target places or people that have some 
sort of symbolic significance, even though it is rarely representative of the actual cause for their 
grievances. Lastly, homegrown attacks tend to not be as devastating as organized attacks but due 
to the little planning required by their tactics, can be much more difficult to intercept.181  
 
The Threat  
Western Europe  
Overall, the threat of Salafist terrorism is greater to Western Europe than it is to the 
United States. The 9/11 attacks have proven themselves to be more of a statistical outlier than a 
forerunner to the devastation that terrorism would end up bringing in the 21st Century.182 
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Excluding 9/11, the GTD demonstrates that Western Europe has experienced the brunt of the 
organized attacks committed by Salafist terrorism and has experienced nearly 8.3 times more 
terrorist attacks than the United States.183 According to the statistical model by Thomas 
Hegghammer concerning returning jihadists, Western Europe has upwards of 300 potential 
violent returnees from the wars in the Middle East.184 In addition, the number of homegrown 
terrorists in Europe exceeds that of the United States.185 However, their overall threat has yet to 
be quantified due to the amorphous nature of the attacks relative to organized terrorism.  
It is clear that Western Europe faces a greater Salafist terrorism threat than the United 
States does. It is also the conclusion of this project that the type of terrorism that poses the 
greatest threat to Western Europe is organized terrorism. The extremely low social and economic 
status of Muslims immigrants and refugees in Europe huddled together in enclaves across 
various countries with little oversight from state agencies allow organizational representatives or 
advocates to penetrate these Muslim communities as evidenced by the radical imams of London 
or the extremist Islamic centers in Germany. These organizational advocates play on the identity 
of vulnerable 2nd and 3rd generation Muslim immigrants in these communities and entice them to 
commit violence on behalf of an organization using more sophisticated tactics that can kill 
hundreds of people in a single attack. As this project has found, homegrown terrorists have yet to 
surpass the level of frequency combined with devastation that organized attacks can wreck on 
Western Europe.    
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The United States 
 The threat of Salafist terrorism to the United States is quite low relative to the threat 
Western Europe faces. The immigration and assimilation culture, government counter-terrorism 
capabilities, and the geography of being literally an ocean away all help to mitigate this threat. 
Given that the 9/11 attacks are more of a statistical outlier than any predictive standard, it 
becomes clear that the overall threat to the United States is quite minimal. According to Brian 
Jenkins, less than 100 people have been killed by Salafist terrorism in the United States from 
post-9/11 to 2016.186  
 In terms of the type of terrorism that poses the greater threat, homegrown terrorism has 
proven itself to be far greater. This is not because organized attacks are not as devastating, but 
because they do not occur in the United States. The GTD only recognizes one actual organized 
attack since 9/11 on U.S. soil and that was the failed “underwear” bomber Umar Farouk 
Abdulmuttalab, who only injured himself and a fellow passenger when his bomb failed to 
detonate.187 It is simply too difficult for a terrorist organization to orchestrate an overseas attack 
resembling anything close to 9/11 as well as recruiting enough people within the United States to 
commit such attacks.  
However, those people that have been killed by Salafist terrorism since 9/11 have all 
been killed by homegrown terrorists. All of the same limitations that characterize European 
homegrown terrorism such as cruder weapons and lack of planning apply to American 
homegrown terrorism, but so do the strengths. The attacks from Abdul Artan, Carlos Bledsoe, 
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and Nidal Hasan show that sometimes a little bit of propaganda or inspiration coupled with a 
personal grievance is all that is necessary to commit to Salafist jihadism, which is incredibly hard 
to pre-emptively counter and can still achieve the status of a mass casualty attack. The only 
silver lining in these instances is that as the more radicalizing agents use the internet, something 
which can and has been monitored by intelligence agencies, a natural filtering effect occurs in 
that very few individuals exposed to, in contact with, or pledge allegiance to jihadism, will 
actually attempt to commit an attack.  
 
Looking Forward 
 The goal of this project was to effectively assess the threat that Salafist Islamic terrorism 
poses to the United States and Western Europe in its two main forms: organized and homegrown. 
In making these discoveries, this project has found and made known why Europe experiences 
more terrorism than the United States (and visa-versa) on multiple levels ranging from public 
policy, social demographics, and geography. While this project is not meant to give any specific 
policy recommendations, it hopes to raise awareness for current public policy strengths and 
weaknesses that lessen or widen the currently posed threat. If pubic policy measures were to be 
adopted, it should be able address the multiple fronts that contribute to this threat as there is no 
one single reason behind the threat of Salafist terrorism to the United States and Western Europe. 
Future research should focus on gathering a firm data set, similar to the GTD, on the homegrown 
terrorist attacks that have occurred in the United States and Western Europe. Such a data set 
would be able to differentiate actual homegrown terrorism from just regular crime, provide 
empirical evidence of trends as they relate to homegrown terrorism and paint a clearer picture of 
the threat it poses.  
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As far as this project is concerned, the threat posed by Salafist terrorism is largely 
overblown, yet misunderstood. Fixating on the worst of the attacks such as 9/11 can create an 
inaccurate picture leading to ineffective public policy that ends up ghost-hunting instead of 
making the necessary changes for mitigating the threat. However, ignoring or willfully 
downplaying the threat can create the same lack of awareness that would allow attacks such as 
Paris, San Bernardino, Nice, or Manchester to rear their ugly head once more. Nuance, balance, 
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